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INTRODUCTION
The growing awareness to the role of comparative law and to the possibilities for
professional interactions between judges has developed a discourse of judicial dialogues
that crosses country borders.1 The Article wishes to look more closely into this discourse
and to evaluate qualitatively the circumstances in which citations from other countries
are used by judges. It does so by focusing on and by looking into an important case-study
that would exemplify the importance of assessing the details of this transnational judicial
* Professor of Law and the Stewart and Judy Colton Chair of Law and Security, Tel-Aviv University, e-
mail: barakerz a post.tau.ac.il.
I would like to thank Ilit Ostrovitch-Levi, Omer Netzer and Lila Zhao for their research assistance and
Ittai Bar-Simantov, Jeffrey Jowell, Yigal Mersel and Markus Wagner for their help in tracking relevant cita-
tions.
1. Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Typology ofTransjudicial Communication, 29 U. RiCH. L. REv. 99 (1994).
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discourse. This case-study is the citations of the jurisprudence of Aharon Barak, Israel's
renowned former Chief Justice.
Following this introduction, Part I of the Article reviews the theoretical issues that
inspire the study. Part II presents the justifications for looking into the case-study of
Aharon Barak as a paradigmatic example for the study of citation practices across bor-
ders. Part III of the Article presents the study conducted on the citations of Barak's juris-
prudence by other courts and the main findings of this study. Part IV of the Article offers
an analysis of the main findings. The Conclusion highlights the implications of the study
for the future research of comparative law and judicial behavior.
1. COMPARATIVE LAW MEETS JUDICIAL STUDIES
The ambition to look more closely into the question of cross-border citation prac-
tices is informed by two strands in current literature: the critical evaluation of compara-
tive law and the growing interest in judicial behavior.
(1) Critical Comparative Law - The first source of inspiration of this study is the
growing criticism on what is perceived as hegemony and cultural biases in the practice of
comparative law. Scholars have often pointed out that comparative law has been tradi-
tionally focused on western legal systems such as the Anglo-American tradition and the
continental tradition.2 Moreover, it is a well-known fact that United States' case law has
been very influential on judicial-decision making abroad, but hardly the other way
around. 3
(2) Judicial Behavior and Reputation - In addition, the current study is informed
by the growing interest in citation practices of judges - who gets cited and when. This
question has been intensively researched, but with a focus on citation practices within the
United States. 4 The current study goes beyond the assumptions and criteria used for the
empirical research focused on domestic courts. In domestic contexts, the studies focus on
judges who have the same judicial rank. Therefore, differences in the tendencies to cite
each of them are interpreted as reflecting their professional reputation. In contrast, a
study focused on judges from other countries would probably reflect also the normative
attitude toward the legal systems they are associated with, and would only partially stand
for their individual reputation. Needless to say, the degree to which courts are open for
the idea of using foreign precedents as "persuasive authority" 5 varies among systems.
2. See, e.g., Annelise Riles, Wigmore 's Treasure Box: Comparative Laiw in the Era of Information, 40
HARV. INT'L L.J. 221, 225, 231-32 (1999).
3. See, e.g., Anthony Lester, The Overseas Trade in the American Bill of Rights, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 537,
561 (1988).
4. The research in this area has been originally focused on the assessment of judicial reputation by follow-
ing patterns of citations. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 20, 41, 48, 56,
105, 130 (1990); Gregory A. Caldeira, On the Reputation of State Supreme Courts, 5 POL. BEHAV. 83, 84
(1983); Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Justice: An Empirical Ranking of
Judge Performance, 78 S. CALIF. L. REV. 23, 32-34 (2004); David Klein & Darby Morrisroe, The Prestige and
Influence of Individual Judges on the U.S. Courts of Appeals, 28 J. LEGAL STUD. 371, 373-76 (1999); Mont-
gomery N. Kosma, Measuring the Influence ofSupreme Court Justices, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 333, 337-38 (1998);
William M. Landes, Lawrence Lessig & Michael Solimine. Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis ofFederal
Courts ofAppeals Judges, 27 J. LEGAL STUD. 271, 271-72 (1998). Later on, it developed to include also meas-
uring biases in citation practices. See, e.g., Stephen J. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Bias in Judicial Citations: A
Window into the Behavior ofJudges? 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 87, 89 (2008).
5. For the concept of "persuasive authority," see Chad Flanders, Toivard a Theory ofPersuasive Authoriy,
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However, these differences have only marginal impact on the analysis offered because it
looks into courts that do cite foreign sources.
(3) Judicial Behavior and Distinctions between Foreign Jurisdictions - The ques-
tion of where to look for relevant decisions as a source of inspiration has always been
part of the debate on the use of comparative law, and yet never got the full attention it
deserves. The topic has been controversial since one of the main oppositions to the use of
comparative law is the seeming lack of guiding principle with regard to the choices of
relevant sources of inspiration.6 Anne-Marie Slaughter, who inspired the discussion
around judicial discourse, only mentioned the lack of reciprocity between the United
States Supreme Court and the courts that cite it. Other scholars pointed at general con-
siderations that merit distinctions between jurisdictions, but in a manner that left the va-
riety for the judges quite broad. One study pointed to "major criteria," which included
three factors - the distinction between democracies and non-democracies; common
characteristics in the social and cultural realms; and the similarity in the principles that
govern the specific case (e.g. recognizing freedom of speech as a fundamental princi-
ple). These criteria hardly say anything, but for the clear disqualification of legal sys-
tems of authoritarian regimes for this purpose. Another study, authored by Eric Posner
and Cass Sunstein, 9 supposedly offered more specific criteria, but with only marginal
additional practical value. Posner and Sunstein founded their justification for the use of
foreign law on the Condorcet Jury Theorem, stating that under certain conditions, a
widespread practice, accepted by a number of independent actors, is highly likely to be
right. Accordingly, they endorsed the following criteria: making recourse to the law of
democracies; refraining from the study of too many legal systems (while supporting the
practice of making reference to more than a few); and avoiding the laws of countries with
10
very small populations. They also address issues of language and thus, support refer-
ence to jurisdictions whose legal materials are translated into English. These criteria lead
them to point to a pool of more countries than those which are currently caught by the
radar of comparative law (they suggest to refer to "ten or twenty countries, including the
Western liberal democracies, plus countries like India, Japan, Brazil, Israel, and South
Korea").1 1 Against this background of highly indefinite criteria, it is interesting to assess
what happens on the ground.
The specific focus of this Article is on the degree to which judges are willing to re-
fer to precedents coming from small or non-hegemonic counties (assuming that they pass
the preliminary tests described above). The question is not whether cases coming from
the United States, United Kingdom, or Germany get cited and thus serve as a source of
62 OKLA. L. REV. 55, 55-56 (2009); H. Patrick Glenu, Persuasive Authority, 32 McGILL L.J. 261, 261, 263,
295-96 (1987).
6. Notable is the dissent of Justice Scalia in Laivrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 598 (2003) (Scalia, J., dis-
senting) ("Court's discussion of ... foreign views (ignoring, of course, the many countries that have retained
criminal prohibitions on sodomy) [was] meaningless dicta.").
7. Slaughter, supra note 1, at 104.
8. Rex D. Glensy, Which Countries Count?: Lawrence v. Texas and the Selection of Foreign Pesuasive
Authority, 45 VA. J. INTL L. 357, 411-38 (2005).
9. Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Other States, 59 STAN. L. REV. 131, 136 (2006).
10. Id. at 169-70.
11. Id. at 170.
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inspiration and guidance, but rather what is the potential of precedents coming from oth-
er countries to become influential or to be at least considered. The question is obviously
very broad, and the Article does not profess to fully investigate it, but rather to offer ten-
tative directions for additional research, based on a meaningful case-study.
A relatively early example of a research which focused on the use of foreign deci-
sions was an empirical analysis conducted by David Zaring, who studied the use of for-
eign decisions by federal courts in the United States.12 In this context, Zaring searched
for citations coming from 14 countries and 2 international organizations, and one of the
questions he addressed was "who cites, and who is cited?" 13 His findings pointed at the
popularity of Canada (who came first by a significant margin) and France. 14 The origin
of citations was, however, only one of the issues Zaring studied, and he sufficed himself
by speculating, in this regard, that "[i]t appears that judges may follow economic rela-
tionships and traditional ties when searching for authority abroad."15
More recently, Gelter and Siems looked into the issue of the country of origin of
citations in a study which focused solely on the use of comparative law by European
courts. Their findings point to the lack of reciprocity between courts regarding the ten-
dency to draw on the experience of one another and to the existing hegemony of certain
countries even among the relatively close community of European courts. 16
II. AHARON BARAK AS A CASE-STUDY
The choice of Aharon Barak as a case-study for uncovering judicial tendencies to
cite from other countries has been a very easy one. On the one hand, he is one of the
most well-known judges of his time, highly respected and widely published, as well as a
world known scholar. In addition, he has served as a Supreme Court Justice for twenty-
eight years, 1 7 and thus was able to author many important decisions as well as to acquire
a reputation that would merit citation. On the other hand, Barak served on the Supreme
Court of a small country - Israel. Israeli law as such did not serve as the basis of any
other system in the world (in contrast to the laws of countries which were in the past co-
lonial powers). In addition, the formal language of Israeli law is Hebrew, which is not
spoken anywhere else in the world (although the major precedents of the court are being
translated and currently available also on the English website of the Israeli Supreme
Court).' 8 It is also worth noting that the practice of comparative law is common in the
Israeli Supreme Court (in decisions of precedential importance) and was extensively used
12. David Zaring, The Use of Foreign Decisions by Federal Courts: An Empirical Analysis, 3 J. EMPIRICAL
LEGAL STUD. 297 (2006).
13. Id. at 320.
14. Id. at 324-25.
15. Id. at 325.
16. See Martin Gelter & Mathias Siems, Language, Legal Origins, and Culture Before the Courts: Cross-
Citations Between Supreme Courts in Europe 6 (Fordham Law Legal Stud. Research Paper No. 1719183),
available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1719183; Martin Gelter & Mathias Siems, Networks, Dialogue or One-
Way Traffic? An Empirical Analysis of Cross-Citations Between Ten European Supreme Courts 17 (Maastricht
Eur. Private Law Inst., Working Paper No. 2011/03 2011), available at http://ssm.com/abstract=1722721.
17. Aharon Barak served as a Supreme Court Justice between 1978 and 2006.
18. For the English website of the Israeli Supreme Court, see THE STATE OF ISRAEL: THE JUDICIAL
AUTHORITY, http://elyonl.court.gov.il/eng/home/index.html (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
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by Barak himself.
These statements - especially regarding the world-wide reputation of Chief Jus-
tice Barak - are worth exploring further, in order to stress the importance of this case
study. Barak's international stature may be exemplified by using some of its most well-
known expressions. In 2002, Barak received the great honor of being invited to write the
traditional annual "Foreword" of the Harvard Law Review. 19 United States Supreme
Court Justice Elena Kagan, the former Dean of Harvard Law School, had referred to him
as her "hero," and these remarks even served as a source of controversy during her con-
firmation hearings when she was criticized for this support by conservative jurists who
had reservations regarding Barak's activist judicial approach as well as regarding the use
of comparative law by the United States Supreme Court in general.20 Barak has also pub-
lished extensively in the United States during the years on the bench, especially in mat-
ters pertaining to his judicial philosophy.21 These publications also served as a focus for
professional attention not only due to their value, but also because of critiques of some of
his views by conservative judges and scholars such as Richard Posner22 and Robert
Bork.23 At the same time, Barak's writings have been cited as inspiring by other schol-
ars.24
III. FACTS: CITATIONS OF AHARON BARAK BY OTHER COURTS
Against this background, taking into account Barak's solid status as a scholar and
his deep involvement in the practice of comparative law, the question is what has been
the degree of usage of Barak's precedents outside Israel.
a. Methodology
The research plan was based on reviewing databases of case-law in various juris-
dictions in the world. The research was designed to include mainly websites of courts in
the so-called Anglo-American world - due to the fact that Barak's writings are available
- either his translated opinions or his books - first and foremost in English. In addi-
tion, English-speaking countries are the ones that Israeli case law had the strongest con-
nections to (taking into consideration the emergence of Israeli law from the British-
influenced colonial legal system, which existed in Palestine during the time of the British
Mandate). Accordingly, the research used websites which covered Britain and Ireland
19. Aharon Barak, The Supreme Court, 2001 Term- Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme
Court in a Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REv. 19, 19-162 (2002) [hereinafter Judge on Judging].
20. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Praise for an Israeli Judge Drives Criticism of Kagan, N.Y. TIMES, June 24
2010, www.nytimes.com/2010/06/25/us/politics/25kagan.html.
21. AHARON BARAK, JUDICIAL DISCRETION ix (Yadin Kaufmann trans., 1989) [hereinafter JUDICIAL
DISCRETION]; AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW xi-xii (Sari Bashi trans., 2005) [hereinaf-
ter PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION]; AHARON BARAK, THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY x (2006) [hereinafter THE
JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY].
22. See RICHARD A. POSNER, How JUDGES THINK 362-68 (2008); Richard A. Posner, Enlightened Despot,
THE NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 23, 2007, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/enlightened-despot.
23. Robert H. Bork, Barak's Rule, AZURE, Winter 2007, at 125, available at
http://www.azure.org.il/download/magazine/ 11 19AZ_27_bork review.pdf.
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("Bailii");25 the United States (through Lexis and Westlaw); India (the official site of the
Supreme Court); 26 Australia (the official site of the High Court); 27 New Zealand (the of-
ficial site of the Supreme Court);28 Canada ("Canlii")29 and (the official site of the Su-
preme Court); 30 and South Africa ("Saflii"). 3 1 In addition, the research covered the web-
sites of the European Courts32 as well as the website of the German Constitutional
Court.33 For the purpose of finding relevant citations the searches used various terms -
Barak, Aharon Barak; Israel and H.C.J. (the abbreviation used for indicating cases given
by the Israeli Supreme Court residing as the High Court of Justice). 34 In addition to this
systematic search, the research tried to verify findings by informal conversations with
jurists in other jurisdictions, which led to two additional findings (one coming from Po-
land and the other from the Czech Republic). Searches have been last updated in Sep-
tember 2010.
It is important to note that this methodology has its limitations. It cannot trace
more subtle forms of influence which are not expressed in direct citations. It is reasona-
ble to assume that judges who meet in professional events and read landmark cases from
other countries may be influenced by forms of thinking and precedents they were ex-
posed to even when they do not directly acknowledge this influence. This is, however, a
shortcoming inherent to all empirical studies of this sort and is not unique to the present
context.
b. General Description of the Findings
The study indicated sixty-one cases in which Aharon Barak was cited, either as a
Justice or Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of Israel or as a scholar who wrote noted
books and articles in vast areas of law. The distribution of the findings among the various
jurisdictions is detailed in Table I which reveals the following: U.S. courts cited Aharon
Barak on eighteen different occasions, out of which four citations referred to Barak's
opinions as a Supreme Court Justice and fourteen referred to his scholarly work; courts
in the United Kingdom cited Aharon Barak on eight different occasions, out of which
five referred to his opinions as a Supreme Court Justice and three referred to his scholar-
ly work; the courts in Canada cited Aharon Barak on twelve different occasions, out of
25. BRITISH AND IRISH LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.bailii.org (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
26. SUPREME COURT OF INDIA, http://www.supremecourtofindia.nic.in (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
27. HIGH COURT OF AUSTRALIA, http://www.hcourt.gov.au (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
28. SUPREME COURT OF NEW ZEALAND, http://www.justice.govt.nz/courts/the-supreme-court/Index (last
visited Oct. 17, 2011).
29. CANLI, http://www.canlii.org (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
30. SUPREME COURT OF CANADA, http://www.scc-csc.gc.ca (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
31. SOUTH AFRICAN LEGAL INFORMATION INSTITUTE, http://www.saflii.org (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
32. EUROPEAN COURT OF HUMAN RIGHTS, http://www.echr.coe.int/ECHR/homepage en (last visited Jan.
26, 2012); THE COURT OF JUSTICE OF THE EUROPEAN UNION,
http://europa.eu/institutions/inst/justice/index-en.htm (last visited Jan. 26, 2012).
33. THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTIONAL COURT, http://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/en/index.html (last
visited Jan. 26, 2012).
34. Then, the findings were also reviewed to make sure that they do not cover references not relevant to the
current research. See, e.g., Ariel Sharon v. Time Inc., 575 F.Supp. 1162, 1164 (S.D.N.Y. 1983) (Barak is men-
tioned in this case as a member of the Kahan Committee, which inquired the massacre in the Sabra and Shatila
refugee camps during the Lebanon war).
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which six referred to his opinions as a Supreme Court Justice and six referred to his
scholarly work; the Supreme Court of India cited Aharon Barak in nine cases, which all
referred to his scholarly work; the courts in South Africa cited Aharon Barak on two dif-
ferent occasions, out of which one referred to an opinion he wrote as a Supreme Court
Justice and one referred to his scholar work; the courts in New Zealand cited Barak one
time, referring to his scholarly work, and the courts in Ireland cited Barak once, citing
one of his opinions. In addition, among jurisdictions outside the so-called Anglo-
American legal world, the findings were the following: the European Court of Human
Rights cited Aharon Barak once, referring to one of his opinions as a Supreme Court Jus-
tice; the Czech Constitutional Court cited Aharon Barak scholarly work once and the
Polish Constitutional Court cited Aharon Barak in one of its decisions referring to several
opinions which he gave as a Supreme Court Justice.
Table I - Distribution of Citations among Jurisdictions
United States 18 4 14
United Kingdom 8 5 3
Canada 12 6 6
Australia 7 4 3
India 9 0 9
European Court of
Human Rights 1 1 0
South Africa 2 1 1
New Zealand 1 0 1
Poland 1 1 0
Czech Republic 1 0 1
Ireland 1 1 0
Total 61 23 38
Evaluating the findings from a different angle not by reference to the legal sys-
tem the citing court belongs to but rather to the sources for the citations - among the
sixty-one different court decisions which cited Aharon Barak, twenty-three referred to
his opinions as a Supreme Court Justice and thirty-eight referred to his scholarly work.
Further analysis of the twenty-three occasions in which Aharon Barak was cited as a Su-
preme Court Justice or a Chief Justice is offered in Table 2, which sorts these judgments
by their subject matter. This table shows that among this group, the decisions which at-
tracted most of the international interest were given in the area of national security - on
eleven different occasions (among the twenty-three) other courts decided to refer to
Aharon Barak's opinions in the field of national security, in many of them to his famous
opinion resisting the use of torture in interrogations. 3 5 The second group of opinions
35. HCJ 5100/94 Pub. Comm. Against Torture in Isr. v. State of Israel 53(4) PD 817 [1999] (Isr.) [hereinaf-
2011 411
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which attracted international attention included five opinions in the field of bioethics and
new medical technologies. On five occasions the different courts cited Aharon Barak's
opinions in other areas of constitutional law and human rights and on two other occa-
sions the courts referred to the decision in the Demjanjuk case,36 which dealt with an in-
dictment of a World-War II Nazi criminal.




Human Rights and Constitutional Issues 5
Based on these basic findings, the following analysis looks more closely into the
more noted occasions in which the different courts cited Aharon Barak, either as a Su-
preme Court Justice or Chief Justice or as a scholar, offering additional commentary and
evaluation of the context of these comparative law citations.
c. Decisions in the Area ofNational Security
As already indicated, most of the cited opinions of Aharon Barak were those given
in the context of national security, and most notably Barak's decision on the prohibition
on torture.37 More specifically, the torture decision was cited eight times by different
courts. It is worth noting that this decision was given in 1999 - in proximity to the Sep-
tember 1 th terror attack, and thus gained even special significance on the discourse of
comparative law.
In A. v. Secretary of State for the Home Department House of Lords,38 the House
of Lords considered the admissibility in a British court or tribunal of evidence that may
have been produced through torture conducted by foreign officials, without the complici-
ty of the British authorities. More specifically, the case addressed hearings in the context
of the Anti-terrorism, Crime and Security Act 2001 enacted as a response to the 9/11 ter-
ror attacks, which allowed the British government to deport non-citizens suspected in in-
volvement in international terror. The House of Lords accepted the appeal and dismissed
the possibility to use such evidence. The main opinion of the court was written by Lord
Bingham of Cornhill. Lord Carswell, who wrote a concurring opinion, cited Aharon Bar-
ak's famous words in the Israeli Torture Case as a source of inspiration for retaining
high moral standard in an open democratic society:
Although a democracy must often fight with one hand tied behind its
back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Preserving the rule of law and
ter Israeli Torture Case].
36. CrimA 347/88 Demianjuk v. State of Israel 47(4) PD 221 [1993] (Isr.).
37. See Israeli Torture Case, supra note 35.
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recognition of an individual's liberty constitutes an important compo-
nent in its understanding of security. At the end of the day, they
strengthen its spirit and its strength and allow it to overcome its diffi-
culties. 39
The British case did not deal with exactly the same legal question decided by the
Israeli Supreme Court in the Israeli Torture Case, but the reference reflects an under-
standing that the two courts shared the same values when they discussed the issue of tor-
ture.
Previous to this decision, in A. v Secretary ofState for the Home Department Court
of Appeal,4 0 the British Court of Appeal considered the same case and got to a different
result - the majority (Lord Justice Pill and Lord Justice Laws) rejected the appeal, while
Justice Neuberger accepted it. In this opinion, Lord Justice Laws referred at length to the
decision of the Israeli Torture Case. In his judgment he quoted Aharon Barak's words,
which were later quoted also by the House of Lords, as well as additional sections from
his decision:
This decision opens with a description of the difficult reality in which
Israel finds herself security wise. We shall conclude this judgment by
re-addressing that harsh reality. We are aware that this decision does
not ease dealing with that reality. This is the destiny of democracy, as
not all means are acceptable to it, and not all practices employed by its
enemies are open before it. Although a democracy must often fight with
one hand tied behind its back, it nonetheless has the upper hand. Pre-
serving the rule of law and recognition of an individual's liberty consti-
tutes an important component in its understanding of security. At the
end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and its strength and allow it to
overcome its difficulties. This having been said, there are those who ar-
gue that Israel's security problems are too numerous, thereby requiring
the authorisation to use physical means. If it will nonetheless be decid-
ed that it is appropriate for Israel, in light of its security difficulties to
sanction physical means in interrogations (and the scope of these means
which deviate from the ordinary investigation rules), this is an issue
that must be decided by the legislative branch which represents the
people. We do not take any stand on this matter at this time. It is there
that various considerations must be weighed. The pointed debate must
occur there. It is there that the required legislation may be passed, pro-
vided, of course, that a law infringing upon a suspect's liberty 'befitting
the values of the state of Israel', is enacted for a proper purpose, and to
an extent no greater than is required (see art 8 of the Basic Law: Human
Dignity and Liberty). 41
39. Id. at para. 150.
40. A v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2004] EWCA (Civ) 1123, [2005] 1 W.L.R. 414 (Eng.) (appeal
taken from U.K.).
41. Id. at para. 250.
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Justice Laws' opinion referred to Barak's judgment in a detailed manner. It de-
scribed the background of the Israeli Supreme Court's decision, which was presented as
highly relevant to the British context as well. It was described as an important presenta-
tion of the limits of power in democracy: "This decision of the Supreme Court of Israel
illustrates, if I may respectfully say so, a basic truth which applies in any jurisdiction
where public power is subject to the rigour of democracy and the rule of law." 42
Interestingly, Justice Neuberger, who wrote the minority opinion in the Court of
Appeals, also referred to Barak's judgment - for the purpose of rejecting the argument of
necessity:
[I]n rejecting the argument based on necessity or exceptional circum-
stances, I derive support from the decision of the Supreme Court of Is-
rael in HCJ 5100/94 Public Committee Against Torture in Israel v Isra-
el (1999) [53(3) PD 817]. In that case, the Israeli Supreme Court had to
consider the lawfulness of the use of torture carried out by Israeli secu-
rity troops on suspected terrorists. Their conclusion in paragraph 38
was this:
According to the existing state of the law, neither the
government nor the heads of security services possess
the authority to establish directives and bestow au-
thorisation regarding the use of liberty infringing
physical means during the interrogation of suspects
suspected of hostile terrorist activities, beyond the
general directives which can be inferred from the
very concept of an interrogation.... An investigator
who insists on employing these methods, or does so
routinely, is exceeding his authority. 43
It is interesting to note that Barak's words were cited in this context by contradict-
ing decisions and by judges who held different views, in a way that acknowledged his
decision as the main authority in this area.
The Canadian courts cited Aharon Barak's opinion in the Israeli Torture Case in
four different occasions. The first occasion was Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizen-
ship and Immigration),44 where the Supreme Court of Canada addressed the question of
whether a refugee from Sri Lanka could be deported back to his homeland, despite the
possibility that he may face torture there. The appellant was detained by Canada due to
terrorist suspicions. He applied for judicial review, alleging that the decision in his matter
was unreasonable, that the procedures under the relevant law were unfair, and that this
law infringed sections 2(b), 2(d) and 7 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.
In deciding this case, the Canadian Supreme Court referred to the decision in the Israeli
Torture Case as an example for the rejection of torture as a legitimate tool to fight terror-
ism. 45 However, this citation did not have direct bearing on the result of the decision. It
42. Id. at para. 251.
43. Id. at para. 495.
44. Suresh v. Canada (Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), [2002] 1 S.C.R. 3 (Can.).
45. Id. at para. 74.
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only reflected the court's conviction regarding the rejection of torture as a legitimate
choice for fighting terrorism.
Another Canadian decision, which discussed the Israeli Torture Case, was In The
Matter Of an application under section 83.28 of the Criminal Code.46 In this decision, an
accused in a plane bombing case challenged the constitutional validity of section 83.28
of the Canadian Criminal Code, arguing that its investigative hearing provisions violated
the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms by infringing on the individual's right to
maintain silence and protect oneself against self-incrimination.
The court cited Aharon Barak's opinion in the Israeli Torture Case47 in a manner
that referred to its general spirit:
This is the fate of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, and
not all methods employed by its enemies are open to it. Sometimes, a
democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its back. Nonetheless,
it has the upper hand. Preserving the rule of law and recognition of
individual liberties constitute an important component of its under-
standing of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and
strength and allow it to overcome its difficulties.48
In Re Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Canada)49 the Canadian Securi-
ty Intelligence Service ("CSIS") asked the Court, for the first time since the enactment of
the Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act ("CSIS Act"), to issue warrants pursuant
to section 21 of the Act. Here as well, the court cited Aharon Barak's opinion in the Is-
raeli Torture Case:
This is the fate of democracy, as not all means are acceptable to it, and
not all methods employed by its enemies are open to it. Sometimes, a
democracy must fight with one hand tied behind its back. Nonetheless,
it has the upper hand. Preserving the rule of law and recognition of in-
dividual liberties constitute an important component of its understand-
ing of security. At the end of the day, they strengthen its spirit and
strength and allow it to overcome its difficulties.50
This citation was used here once again to elaborate on the idea that the response to terror-
ism should be conducted within the rule of law and while preserving the cherished liber-
ties which are essential to democracy.
Finally, a Canadian court cited Aharon Barak's opinion in the Israeli Torture Case
in Khadr v. Canada,51 which concerned the matter of a sixteen year old Canadian citi-
zen, who was arrested in Afghanistan by American troops and held as a detainee in
Guantanamo Bay. He was accused of involvement in international terrorism, and spent
seven years in Guantanamo Bay, while Canada refused to ask for his extradition. Eventu-
ally, he applied to a Canadian court and requested to receive all the relevant information
held by Canada in order to assist him in his trial in Guantanamo Bay. The decision given
46. Application under s. 83.28 of the Criminal Code (Re), 2004 SCC 42, [2004] 2 S.C.R. 248 (Can.).
47. Id. at para. 7.
48. Israeli Torture Case, supra note 35, at para. 39.
49. Canadian Security Intelligence Service Act (Re) (F.C.), [2008] 3 F.C.R. 477 (Can.).
50. Id. at para. 40.
51. Khadr v. Att'y Gen. of Can., 2008 FC 807, 59 C.R. (6th) 284, 175 C.R.R. (2d) 345, 331 F.T.R. 1.
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Justice Mosley dealt with the harsh methods of investigation used against Khadr, and
concluded that they were indeed in breach of international human rights law. In this con-
text, he referred to the Israeli Torture Case, in which Chief Justice Barak discussed simi-
lar methods of investigation:
Canada's international human rights obligations include the United Na-
tions Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrad-
ing Treatment or Punishment, Can. T.S. 1987 No. 36, ("UNCAT"), to
which the US is also a signatory. The application of this Convention to
specific types of interrogation practices employed by military forces
against detainees was discussed by the Supreme Court of Israel in Public
Committee against Torture in Israel v. Israel 38 I.L.M. 1471 (1999). The
practice of using these techniques to lessen resistance to interrogation was
found to constitute cruel and inhuman treatment within the meaning of the
Convention. 52
This decision is an interesting example for the use of Barak's judgment not only for the
purpose of declaring allegiance to the protection of human rights in times of threat to na-
tional security but rather for the purpose of analyzing the facts of the case. 53
The High Court of Australia referred to Aharon Barak's opinions in the field of
National Security on three different occasions. In Al-Kateb v. Godwin,54 the High Court
of Australia dealt with the Migration Act 1958, which allows for an administrative deten-
tion of aliens who enter the country unlawfully. The appellant in this case was a stateless
Palestinian born in Kuwait. He was detained and asked to be removed from custody, but
there was no state to which he could be deported. The question was whether the Migra-
tion Act of 1958 permitted a stateless person to be detained indefinitely, and if so,
whether this was permissible under Australia's Constitution. The majority of the court
concluded that the Migration Act enables an administrative detention even when there
are no prospects for its ending, and that such detention is not unconstitutional. In con-
trast, in a minority opinion, Justice Kirby held that the Act should be interpreted as not
allowing for an indefinite administrative detention and supported his judgment by refer-
ring to the opinion of Aharon Barak in the Israeli Torture Case, as cited again by Aharon
Barak himself in his decision on the Israeli Security Barrier, known as the Beit Sourik
Case:
This is the destiny of a democracy - she does not see all means as ac-
ceptable, and the ways of her enemies are not always open before her.
A democracy must sometimes fight with one arm tied behind her back.
Even so, a democracy has the upper hand. The rule of law and individ-
ual liberties constitute an important aspect of her security stance. At the
end of the day, they strengthen her spirit and this strength allows her to
52. Id. at para. 87. Justice Mosley went on to conclude: "The practice described to the Canadian official in
March 2004 was, in my view, a breach of international human rights law respecting the treatment of detainees under
UNCAT and the 1949 Geneva Conventions. Canada became implicated in the violation when the DFAIT official
was provided with the redacted information and chose to proceed with the interview." Id at para. 88.
53. It is worth noting that this matter was the subject of more litigation, which also got to the Supreme
Court of Canada. See Canada (Prime Minister) v. Khadr, 2010 SCC 3, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 44 (Can.).
54. Al-Kateb v Godiin (2004) 219 CLR 562 (AustI.).
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overcome her difficulties. 55
The Beit Sourik Case was cited in two other dissenting opinions authored by Jus-
tice Kirby. In Thomas v Mowbray,56 the court dealt with the validity of Subdivision B of
Division 104 of the Commonwealth Criminal Code, authorizing the imposition of "inter-
im control orders." 57 The case dealt with interim control orders which were applied to an
Australian citizen, who was accused of involvement in international terrorism. These
measures were used after his acquittal due to the fact the evidence against him was pro-
duced through torture. The majority of the court dismissed his argument against the con-
stitutionality of the measures used against him. Justice Kirby, who was dissenting, quot-
ed here as well Barak's decision in the Beit Sourik Case (to support the general claim
that civilized nations adhere to the protection of human rights even in the face of threat to
national security). In Re ColonelA ird,58 the High Court of Australia recognized the con-
stitutionality of military tribunals established for dealing with conduct regarded as "ser-
vice connected" or for the purpose of enforcing and maintaining discipline among the
defence forces (discussing the case of a rape committed overseas by a member of the
Australian army on leave). Justice Kirby who dissented once again referred here as well
to the Beit Sourik Case as comparative law example to the obligation of the court to pro-
tect basic human rights. 59
An example from another jurisdiction comes from the decision of the Polish Con-
stitutional Court in Orzecznictwo Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego Zbidr Urzedowy. 60 The
court had to decide a challenge to Article 122a of the Act of 3 July 2002 (the Aviation
Law) regarding its conformity with Articles 38, 31.3, 26 and 30 of the Polish Constitu-
tion. The Court stated that there was no need for reinterpretation of human rights stand-
ards in order to protect public safety from terrorist attacks, and added that it shares this
view with other courts, including the House of Lords, the Federal Constitutional Court of
Germany and the United States Supreme Court. In this context, the court also referred to
Aharon Barak's opinions in the Israeli Torture Case as well as other decisions on nation-
al security and human rights in the occupied territories. 6 1
Finally, it should be noted that Barak's decision in the Israeli Torture Case had
visibility in the context of the decision of the European Court of Justice in Kadi v. Coun-
cil of the European Union;62 although formally speaking it was not cited in the decision
itself.63 In this case, the court analyzed the legality of the freezing of assets of individu-
als suspected as involved in aiding terrorist organizations based on the United Nations
55. HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov't of Isr. 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (Isr.) [hereinafter Beit
Sourik Case].
56. Thomas v. Moivbray (2007) 233 CLR 307 (Austl.).
57. Id.
58. Re Colone/ Aird (2004) 220 CLR 308 (Austl.).
59. It should be noted, however, that this reference was in a footnote and there was neither an elaborated
discussion nor a quote of Aharon Barak's opinion in this case.
60. Judgment K 44/07 of September 30, 2008, Orzecznictwo Trybunalu Konstytucyjnego, 2008, no. 7A,
item 126.
61. HCJ 3278/02 Ctr. for the Def. of the Individual v. Commander of IDF Forces in the W. Bank, 57(1)
P.D. 385 [2002] (Isr.); HCJ 3239/02 Marab v. Commander of IDF Forces in the W. Bank 57(2) P.D. 349
[2002] (Isr.). These Israeli decisions are listed but not discussed beyond that.
62. Case C-402/05, Kadiv. Council of the E.U., 2008 E.C.R. 1-6351.
63. Accordingly, this decision is not included in the empirical data presented in the tables.
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Security Council resolutions in this area. The court found that Security Council's
measures were unfair to the appellant who did not have an opportunity to challenge his
inclusion in the lists of people and organizations supporting terrorism. This decision fol-
lowed the view presented in the opinion which Advocate General Maduro presented to
the court. That opinion included the following citation from Barak' s decision in the Is-
raeli Torture Case:
It is when the cannons roar that we especially need the laws ... Every
struggle of the state -against terrorism or any other enemy -is con-
ducted according to rules and law. There is always law which the state
must comply with. There are no "black holes"...The reason at the
foundation of this approach is not only the pragmatic consequence of
the political and normative reality. Its roots lie much deeper. It is an ex-
pression of the difference between a democratic state fighting for its life
and the fighting of terrorists rising up against it. The state fights in the
name of the law and in the name of upholding the law. The terrorists
fight against the law, while violating it. The war against terrorism is al-
so law's war against those who rise up against it. 6
Advocate General Maduro cited Barak's opinion to demonstrate his argument that the
measures used to suppress international terrorism should be in conformity to the rule of
law and the protection of human rights.
d. Bioethics and Medical Innovations
A second area of law in which Barak's decisions were cited is that which deals
with bioethics and medical innovations. In this context, several courts cited two of Bar-
ak's most famous opinions as a Supreme Court Justice - in the Nahmani affair, 65which
dealt with a controversy on the fate of frozen embryos (which were the fruits of a long
and complicated IVF procedure) between an estranged husband and wife and in Zeitzqff
v. Katz, 66which dealt with a wrongful life tort action. These opinions were cited on five
different occasions -the decisions in the Nahmani case were cited on three occasions,
and the Katz case was cited in two judgments.
With regard to the Nahmani affair, it is interesting to note that the Israeli Supreme
Court decided this case twice -based on its special pow~er to rehear a case that poses
complicated and innovative questions. In its first decision, the Court, in the majority de-
cision of four justices, one of whom was Justice Barak, against the minority opinion of
the fifth Justice, ruled for the husband who opposed the continuation of the surrogacy
procedure without his consent. Eventually, the Court changed its ruling and decided in
another majority decision (of seven justices against four in the minority which included
Justice Barak) for the wife -for whom the process was, for practical purposes, the last
chance for becoming a biological mother.
64. Kadi, at para. 45 (citing Israeli Torture Case, supra note 35, at paras. 61-62).
65. CA 5587/93 Nahmani v. Nahmani 49(l) PD 485 [1995] (Isr.J; CFH 2401/95 Nahmani v. Nahmani
50(4) PD 661 [1996] (lsr.) (in which this matter was reheard and re-decided by the Israeli Supreme Court). For
an analysis of these decisions, see also Daphne Barak-Erez and Ron Shapira, The Delusion of Symmetric
Rights, 19 OXFORD. J. L. STUD. 297 (1999).
66. CA 518/82 Zeitzoff v. Katz 40(2) PD 85 [1986] (Jsr.).
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Kass v. Kass67 was an American case similar to the basic features of the Nahmani
affair. It involved a husband and wife who sought to have a child and underwent in vitro
fertilization. After the marriage ended, the wife sought possession of the pre-zygotes,
which had been frozen for future implantation. The trial court awarded possession to the
wife, and the husband sought review. The Appellate Division of the Supreme Court of
New York reversed, finding that while the wife had a fundamental right to procreate and
the husband had a fundamental right to avoid procreation, the controlling factor was the
existence of a consent form, signed by the parties, which controlled the disposition of
unused pre-zygotes. Because the consent form provided for the in vitro fertilization pro-
gram to maintain possession of the pre-zygotes in the case of divorce, the wife was im-
properly awarded possession. One of the dissenting judges pointed out that cryogenic
preservation raised dilemmas abroad as well, and within this discussion mentioned the
two Nahmani decisions, although the judge did not elaborate on them due to the lack of
available translation (at the time). 68
Evans v. United Kingdom69 was a decision of the European Court of Human
Rights which dealt with a challenge to the United Kingdom IVF law, according to which
both parties must give their consent for IVF procedures to continue or the embryos must
be destroyed. The case concerned a couple who stored frozen embryos before the wife
had to go through serious medical procedures. Later, the couple broke up, and the man
opposed the idea of using the stored embryos created from his sperm.
The appellant claimed that as treatment was already under way, the potential father
should not have the right to stop it. The European Court of Human Rights, while sympa-
thetic to the situation, decided that although the matter could have been regulated differ-
ently, the law did not infringe human rights in a manner that necessitated judicial inter-
vention. For the purpose of making this decision, the court explored how other
jurisdictions have addressed the issue and within this comparison cited the Nahmani se-
cond decision.70 The court noted that the Israeli view is different, but mentioned that
there was also a minority opinion supported by Chief Justice Barak.
The third reference to the Nahmani affair, was in the United States case of A.Z v.
B.Z71 which exemplifies an indirect form of reference to comparative law. In this case,
the Supreme Court of Massachusetts held that the procreative right of a woman must
yield to the right of a man not to be forced to procreate. While the decision did not spe-
67. Kass v. Kass, 663 N.Y.S.2d 581, 583 (N.Y. App. Div. 1997).
68. The relevant passage from the opinion of Judge Miller states the following:
Cryogenic preservation has caused controversy abroad as well. The Supreme Court of Is-
rael initially rejected a divorced woman's decision to implant frozen pre-zygotes over the
objections of her former husband (see, Nachmani v Nachmani, Mar. 30, 1995, C.A.
5587/93). However, upon further review and reconsideration by the entire court (see,
Gordon, Court Upholds Legitimacy of Second Hearings, JERUSALEM POST, Mar. 3,
1996, at 12), a 7-to-4 majority awarded possession of the pre-zygotes to Mrs. Nachmani,
finding that once fertilization had occurred through IVF, 'the positive right' to be a par-
ent overcame 'the negative right not to be [one]' (Friedman, A Victory for Life,
Westchester Jewish Week, Sept. 20, 1996, at 1, 39). Unfortunately attempts to obtain an
English translation of the decision have been unsuccessful.
Id. at 596. The appeal in this case did not change the decision. See Kass v. Kass, 696 N.E.2d 174 (N.Y. 1998).
69. Evans v. United Kingdom, App. No. 6339/05, 43 Eur. H.R. Rep. 21 paras. 7-8, 12-13 (2006).
70. Id. at para. 49.
71. A.Z. v. B.Z., 725 N.E.2d 1051 (Mass. 2000).
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cifically cite the Nahmani case, the court did use it as an example to support its view -
referring to academic writings which analyzed it.72 The Nahmani decision was not men-
tioned in the decision, but there is external evidence to support the argument that the
court indeed looked into it - the judge who authored this decision specifically stated so
in a law review article she published on the uses of comparative law. 73 Once again, here
the reference was to the first Nahmani decision rather than the second one.
The other Israeli decision that served as a point of reference in the area of bioethics
and modern medicine was the Katz case, which recognized, in a majority decision, the
possibility of bringing a "wrongful life" 74 tort action. Aharon Barak was one of the Jus-
tices who formed this majority.
In Harriton v. Stephens,75 when the High Court of Australia debated the issue of
wrongful life, it referred to similar cases from around the world, and among them the
Katz case. 76 The Katz decision also served as a point of reference to a Canadian court in
the decision given in Bovingdon v. Hergott (in Ontario). In this case, the defendant was
a doctor who prescribed drugs to the plaintiff. Her baby was born with disabilities. The
plaintiff alleged that lack of information regarding the risks of the medicine deprived her
of the choice to attempt pregnancy without taking fertility drug. The Canadian court cited
Barak's opinion in the Katz case, observing that it would be worthy to look into it.
e. Other Human Rights and Constitutional Cases
Courts in the UK, South Africa, Ireland and Canada cited additional opinions of
Aharon Barak in the area of human rights and constitutional law on five other occasions.
Among them, three cited the Danielowitz case 79 - the leading Israeli precedent on equal
rights to homosexuals.
In Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Housing Ass'n Ltd.,80 the House of Lords discussed the
question whether a homosexual partner could be considered a "spouse" entitled to inherit
his partner's rights in a flat in which they were both living together for decades. More
specifically, the House of Lords had to decide whether the term "spouse" in The Rent
Act 1977 could be interpreted as referring also to same-sex relationship. In the majority
opinion, Lord Slynn of Hadley, referred to Aharon Barak's opinion in the Danielowitz
case, which dealt with the rights of same-sex partners as "spouses" for the purpose of
employment benefits (as an example to the changing trends towards homosexuals' rights
72. Id. at 1055.
73. Margaret H. Marshall, "Wise Parents Do Not Hesitate to Learn From Their Children": Interpreting
State Constitutions in an Age of Global Jurisprudence, 79 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1633, 1647 (2004).
74. A "wrongful life" suit is a tort action against a doctor whose negligence caused the birth of disabled
child (in the sense that the pregnancy was not stopped) when the action is brought by the impaired individual
himself (who could not be born healthy but rather either born with the disability or not born at all). According
to the malority opinion in the Israeli Supreme Court, in extreme circumstances, non-life may be considered
preferable to impaired life, and thus the wrongdoer should compensate the person born with such disabilities in
a manner that would better his life as far as money can help.
75. Harriton v. Stephens (2006) 226 CLR 52 (Austl.).
76. Id. at para. 266.
77. Bovingdon v. Hergott, 2006 CanLII 31202 (ON SC).
78. Id. at para. 12.
79. HCJ 721/94 El-Al Isr. Airlines Ltd. v. Danielowitz 48(5) PD 749 [1994] (Isr.).
80. Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Hous. Ass'n, Ltd., [2001] 1 A.C. (H.L.) 27 (appeal taken from Eng.).
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in countries outside of the UK).
Similarly, in National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v. Minis-
ter f Hoe Af81ter of Home Affairs and Others, the Constitutional Court of South Africa referred to the
Danielowitz case when it dealt with immigration legislation that facilitated the immigra-
tion into South Africa of spouses of permanent South African residents, but did not ex-
tend this right to gay and lesbian partners of permanent South African residents. In ac-
cepting the appeal in this case, Justice Ackermann referred to not only the Danielowitz
case as an example of the significant changes societies outside of South Africa have
faced regarding rights of homosexuals, but also to the Fitzpatrick case discussed above,
which also referred to the Danielowitz decision.
The Danielowitz decision was once again cited in Regina v. Secretary of State for
Education and Employment.82 In this case, the court stated that, "[o]nly the worst dicta-
torships try to eradicate those differences." 83
In D. (T.) v. Minister for Education,84 the Supreme Court of Ireland referred to an-
other important constitutional decision from Israel - the United Mizrahi Bank85 case in
which the Israeli court recognized its power to practice judicial review of legislation. The
Irish court dealt with the question of the state's constitutional obligation to provide for
accommodation of children with special needs. The court discussed the question of the
proper level of judicial review regarding public policy, which involves budgets and spe-
cific details. The appellants claimed that the solutions offered to them by the state were
not sufficient, and the judges debated whether they should intervene and enforce their
constitutional rights by ordering the state to open institutions that could accommodate
children with special needs. In her opinion, Justice Denham referred broadly to Justice
Barak's analysis of the place of the court in democracy. She accepted Barak's view as
explained in the United Mizrahi Bank case in the following passage:
I adopt this analysis of the place of judicial review and the protection
of fundamental rights in a modern democratic constitution. The Consti-
tution of Ireland, 1937 is such a modem constitution, which protects
democracy, fundamental rights and the rule of law. It is a duty and ob-
ligation of the courts to protect constitutional rights and to judicially
review decisions. This is done within the parameters of the Constitu-
tion and the law. Judicial adjudications are made and discretion is ex-
ercised in accordance with the Constitution and mindful of the princi-
ple of the separation of powers. However, ultimately the court is the
protector and guarantor of the fundamental rights and the rule of law
under the Constitution. Such a duty to guard fundamental rights should
not be shirked or abdicated. 86
81. Nat 1 Coal. for Gay and Lesbian Equal. v. Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA I (CC) at 48 para. 48
(S. Afr.).
82. Regina v. Sec'y of State for Educ. and Emp't, [2005] UKHL 15, [2005] 2 A.C. (H.L.) 246 (appeal taken
from Eng.).
83. Id. at 271.
84. D. (T.) v. Minister for Educ., [2001] 4 I.R. 259 (Ir.).
85. CA 6821/93 United Mizrahi Bank Ltd. v. Migdal Coop. Vill. 49(4) PD 221 [1995] (Isr.).
86. D. (T.) v. Minister of Educ., [2001] 4 I.R. 259 (Ir.).
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In other words, Barak's view on the role of a judge in a democracy had an important in-
fluence on Justice Denham's judgment. Denham was dissenting, ordering that the appeal
be rejected, meaning that the High Court was right when it ordered the state to meet the
appellants' needs. The other four justices, among them Chief Justice Keane, accepted the
appeal, and held that the High Court was mistaken. Although the other justices did not
mention Barak's approach explicitly, it is clear from the decision that as a general rule,
they tended to adopt a more "conservative" view on the judicial role.
Finally, the Supreme Court of Canada cited from Barak when he discussed freedom of
religion in Bruker v. Marcovitz. The decision dealt with an action brought by a Jewish
woman against her former husband who declined to divorce her according to Jewish reli-
gious law for many years. The defendant argued that he was entitled to practice his free-
dom of religion in this regard. The Supreme Court of Canada dismissed the argument and
quoted from the Israeli case of Temple Mount Faithful to make the case that freedom of
religion should be balanced against other values and interests. In this regard, he quoted,
"[fireedom of conscience, belief, religion and worship is a relative one. It has to be bal-
anced with other rights and interests which also deserve protection, like private and pub-
lic property, and freedom of movement. One of the interests to be taken into considera-
tion is public order and security." 89
f Holocaust Trials
Finally, in two different occasions, courts in the United States cited the decision in
the Demjanjuk case. 90 In this famous decision, the Supreme Court of Israel dismissed the
case against John Demjanjuk, who was accused of being "Ivan the Terrible" from
Treblink. Demjanjuk was charged and found guilty at the district court level. At the ap-
peal level, subsequent to Demjanjuk's conviction and following a death penalty sentence,
the prosecution submitted to the court newly discovered evidence brought from the ar-
chives of the former USSR that shed some doubt on the conviction. Based on this evi-
dence, he was acquitted in a decision that celebrated the gap between real-life truth and
legal truth. Barak was one of the justices on the panel that acquitted Demjanjuk. This fact
is of special interest because he himself survived the holocaust in Europe as a child. At
any rate, the decision of the court was unanimous, and in contrast to the custom in ordi-
nary cases, it is not mentioned who authored it. It was rather given as a decision of the
court as a whole. As indicated, the Demjanjuk case was found to be cited twice as carry-
ing the message that a decision in a criminal trial does not necessarily reflect the pure
and absolute truth.
In the case of United States v. Holstrom,91 the defendant was charged in state court
with arson, but the charge was dismissed since the evidence was insufficient. The United
States then moved forward with an indictment against the defendant for insurance fraud.
After the federal charges were dismissed, the defendant challenged the institution of this
87. Bruker v. Marcovitz, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (Can.).
88. HCJ 292/83 Temple Mount Faithful v. Jerusalem Dist. Police Commander 38(2) PD 449 [1984] (Isr.).
89. Bruker v. Markovitz, [2007] 3 S.C.R. 607 (Can.).
90. See CrimA 347/88 Dermjanjuk v. State of Israel 47(4) PD 221 [1993] (Isr.).
91. United States v. Holstrom, 246 F. Supp. 2d 1101, 1103 (E.D. Wash. 2003).
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federal prosecution after her former acquittal of arson in State court and asked for com-
pensation. The court dismissed her request holding that it could only award fees if the
government's acts were frivolous, vexatious, or done in bad faith, and that none of these
standards had been met. In its reasoning, the court cited Barak's opinion in the
Demjanjuk case to exemplify the spirit of criminal trials: "[t]he matter is closed-but not
complete. The complete truth is not the prerogative of the human judge." 92
Similarly, in Kuch v. United States,93 a case that involved a suit by the family of a
victim of a Piper airplane crash accident, the plaintiffs failed to establish by a preponder-
ance of the evidence that a C-17 flight took place at the time of the Piper accident. They
also failed to establish that a C-17 was near the accident site when the Piper aircraft
crashed. The court cited the same words of Barak's opinion in the Demjanjuk case 94 to
justify its decision to stand by the facts of the case, despite its sympathy for the victim's
family. The reference is once again to the general principle as stated by the Israeli court
and not to the actual decision in that case.
g. Citations of Barak's Academic Writings
Alongside the citations of Barak's most noted opinions in his capacity as a Su-
preme Court Justice, the vast majority of citations by the courts worldwide referred to
Aharon Barak's scholarly work - books and law journal articles. It is important to note,
however, that Barak authored most of the cited sources after he was appointed as a Su-
preme Court Justice (during the years he served as a Justice, and later on as Chief Jus-
tice). As indicated in Table 3 below, among the thirty-eight citations of Aharon Barak's
scholarly work - eighteen referred to his views on interpretation, eight referred to his
views on the role of the judiciary and judicial theory, six referred to his analysis of the
proportionality doctrine 9 5 and four referred to other issues in the area of constitutional
law and human rights. Only two other court cases cited Barak's scholarly work from his
time as professor before he was nominated to the Israeli Supreme court (regarding vicar-
ious liability and shareholders liability).
Table 3 - Distribution According to Subject Matter of Scholarly Work
Interpretation 18
Role of the Judiciary and Judicial Theory 8
Proportionality 6






92. Id. at 1111.
93. Kuch v. United States, No. CV-03-0355-JLQ, 2007 WL 2874974, at *1-2 (E.D. Wash. Sept. 29, 2007).
94. Id at *4.
95. Aharon Barak, Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience, 57 U. TORONTO. L.J. 369 (2007).
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The majority of citations from Barak's academic writings referred to his theory of
interpretation.
In the UK, an example to this is Etame v. Secretary of the State for the Home De-
partment & Anirah v. Secretary of the State for the Home Departmentt,96 which dealt
with asylum rights. Both claimants asked for the revocation of their deportation orders on
the basis of section 92(4)(a) of the Nationality Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The
court decided that neither appellant had an in-country appeal right simply by virtue of
having made a protection claim or having made fresh representations supported by dif-
ferent material in pursuit of such a claim. The court cited Barak's words in his book Pur-
posive Interpretation in Law, with regard to "[d]eviating from the language of the text to
avoid absurdity." 97 More concretely, the statutory text should be construed in the con-
text of the scheme of the statute as a whole, and therefore, if the consequences of adopt-
ing a literal construction were so peculiar as to be characterized as absurd, then principles
of statutory construction require the court to read the words in a manner that avoids the
absurdity.
In the United States, the vast majority of quotations from Barak concerned his the-
ory of interpretation, which served a source of inspiration for judges who resisted mere
literal or textual interpretation. In most cases, the reference has been to his early book
Judicial Discretion.9 8
In BedRoc Ltd. v. United States,99 the petitioners, owners of properties subject to a
reservation of valuable minerals under the Pittman Underground Water Act of 1919,100
sued for quiet title to sand and gravel in their properties. The Court held that while the
sand and gravel were minerals, they could not be considered valuable within the meaning
of the Act. Justice Stevens, who dissented (and was supported by Justice Souter and Jus-
tice Ginsburg), attacked the majority's refusal to examine the legislative history of the
law, considered by him as "one of the most valuable tools of judicial decision making".
In this context, he referred to Barak's book Judicial Discretion and stated:
As Justice Aharon Barak of the Israel Supreme Court perceptively has
explained, the "minimalist" judge "who holds that the purpose of the
statute may be learned only from its language" retains greater discre-
tion than the judge who "will seek guidance from every reliable
source." . . . A method of statutory interpretation that is deliberately
uninformed, and hence unconstrained, increases the risk that the
96. Etame v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't and Anirah v. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't, [2008]
EWHC 1140, [2008] All E.R. (D) 326 (Eng.).
97. Id. at para. 38.
98. JUDICIAL DISCRETION, supra note 21. Another case that mentioned the book Judicial Discretion, Ahmad
v. Wigen, 726 F.Supp. 389, 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1989), was not counted as this was a decision on a petition for a writ
of habeas corpus to prevent extradition to Israel to stand trial for murder. For the purpose of deciding this peti-
tion, the court had to discuss the Israeli legal system and the rights of defendants in it. Barak's book was men-
tioned here not as part of the comparative law discourse, but rather because the fairness of the Israeli system
was one of the issues the court had to decide.
99. BedRoc Ltd. v. United States, 541 U.S. 176, 182 (2004).
100. Pittman Act, ch. 77, 41 Stat. 293 (1919).
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judge's own policy preferences will affect the decisional process.101
Justice Stevens used Barak's words to show that the majority's way of interpretation did
not narrow judicial discretion, but rather broadened it, as it ignored information that
could have affected the decision. Thus, Stevens warned, judges may prefer their own pol-
icies over that of Congress.
In Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, the Court addressed the question whether the
Federal Arbitration Act, which excluded "contracts of employment of seamen, railroad
employees, or any other class of workers engaged in foreign or interstate commerce"
from the Act's coverage, applied to employment contracts.102 The majority of the Court
held that it did not. Justice Stevens, dissenting (with the support of Justice Souter, Justice
Ginsburg and Justice Breyer) claimed that the majority had chosen to ignore legislative
history and important considerations expressed by Congress. He quoted in this context
the same words of Barak from his book Judicial Discretion and stated:
This case illustrates the wisdom of an observation made by Justice
Aharon Barak of the Supreme Court of Israel. He has perceptively not-
ed that the "minimalist" judge "who holds that the purpose of the stat-
ute may be learned only from its language" has more discretion than
the judge "who will seek guidance from every reliable source.103
In Koons Buick Pontiac GMC v. Nigh,104 the plaintiff was a consumer who at-
tempted to purchase a truck from the defendant, a dealer. He sued for a violation of the
Truth in Lending Act (TILA) and was awarded compensation. The Court addressed the
question whether parties who suffered no actual damage could recover more than the
Truth in Lending Act's original $1,000 cap based on subsequent amendments to the act.
The Court held that he could not. Here, Barak's Judicial Discretion was cited in a foot-
note in Justice Stevens' concurrence (to which Justice Breyer joined) in order to point to
the need to examine more closely legislative intent: "[w]e execute our duty as judges
most faithfully when we arrive at an interpretation only after 'seek[ing] guidance from
every reliable source."' 10 5
In Linton v. KB Home Indiana, Inc., 106 the Plaintiff sued her former employer
alleging violations of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. Defendant moved to
compel arbitration pursuant to an arbitration clause in the employment contract. In op-
posing the motion, the plaintiff argued that her claims were not subject to arbitration be-
cause she did not knowingly and voluntarily waive her right to a judicial forum as re-
quired by the Older Workers Benefit Protection Act's ("OWBPA"). The District Court in
the Southern District of Indiana court held that the OWBPA waiver requirements do not
apply to jury trial waivers in arbitration agreements. The court cited Justice Stevens' dis-
senting opinion in the Circuit City case, which based itself on Barak's book: "minimal-
ist" judge "who holds that the purpose of the statute may be learned only from its lan-
101. BedRoc, 541 U.S. at 192.
102. Circuit City Stores, Inc. v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 109 (2001).
103. Id. at 133.
104. Koons Buick Pontiac GMC v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 57-58 (2004).
105. Id. at 66 n.1.
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guage" has more discretion than the judge "who will seek guidance from every reliable
source.',107 Similarly, Barak's book was cited by reference to Justice Stevens' opinion in
the Circuit City case in Fox v. Catholic Knights Ins. Soc.,108 State v. Courchesne,109 and
Bukowski v. City ofDetroit.1 10
In Re Millcreek Twp. Zoning Ordinance11 1 involved a challenge to the decision of
a zoning hearing board to uphold the validity of an ordinance. The appellants argued that
the ordinance was substantively invalid under an equal protection analysis and that it
contravened the public policy of the commonwealth and violated the federal Fair Hous-
ing Act. The court cited Barak's Judicial Discretion and quoted him at length, to de-
scribe the duty of the court in interpreting a statute:
The interpreter must uncover, from among the spectrum of linguistic
possibilities, that meaning which will accomplish the purpose of the
statute. 'The statute is an instrument for executing a legislative goal,
and therefore it must be interpreted according to the purpose it embod-
ies.' 'The judge, when he comes to interpret the statute, should ask
himself: what normative social goal does this statute seek to attain?'
Indeed, it is an established rule of interpretation in most systems that a
statute is to be interpreted in light of its legislative purpose and with a
view to effecting its accomplishment.'112
Barak's views on interpretation were cited twice in Australia. Re Minister for Im-
migration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Ex Parte Ame 113 was an immigra-
tion case that addressed the constitutional restraints on changing or regulating one's citi-
zenship status. The court cited Barak's article "A Judge on Judging" for the purpose of
substantiating its own view that it would be "useful and proper to check conclusions af-
fecting constitutional interpretation by reference to any relevant international law, and
especially as such law relates to human rights and fundamental freedoms." 114
In Palgo Holdings Pty Ltd. v Gowans, the Australian court had to interpret the term
107. Id. at *6 n.3.
108. Fox v. Catholic Knights Ins. Soc'y, 665 N.W.2d 181, 196 n.13 (Wis. 2003).
109. State v. Courchesne, 816 A.2d 562, 584 n.28 (Conn. 2003). In this case, a defendant was convicted of
murder and capital felony murder in connection with the stabbing of a mother and her unborn child. Id at 567-
68. The Supreme Court of Connecticut held that the state was required only to prove that the defendant killed
one of the victims in an especially heinous, cruel or depraved manner. Id at 590. In a separate portion of its
opinion, the court discussed its approach to statutory construction and stated that it would ordinarily consider
all relevant sources of meaning of a statute without first having to determine whether the language at issue is
ambiguous. Id. at 581-84. In that context, the court referred to the words of Justice Stevens in Circuit City who
quoted Barak, but does not add any reference of its own to Barak.
I10. Bukowski v. City of Detroit, 732 N.W.2d 75 (Mich. 2007). In this case, the Supreme Court of Michigan
discussed a case of freedom of information. Id. at 77. The question was whether a reporter who asked to receive
a copy of an internal report on police mishandling should be answered positively. Id The appellate court ac-
cepted the reporter's appeal, but the majority opinion in the Supreme Court of Michigan reversed the decision.
Id. at 81. Judge Kelly, dissenting, referred to Justice Steven's dissenting opinion in BedRoc Ltd. v. United
States, 541 U.S. 176, 192 (2004). Bukowski, 732 N.W.2d at 86 n.12 (Kelly, J., dissenting).
111. In Re Millcreek Twp. Zoning Ordinance, 4 Pa. D. & C.4th 449, No. 3313-A-1988, 1989 WL 230557
(Ct. C.P. Pa. Erie County July 25, 1989) [hereinafter Milicreek Case].
112. Id. at 458-59.
113. Re Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs Ex Parte Ame, (2005) 222 CLR
439 (Austl.).
114. Id. at para. 121.
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"pawned goods" in the context of the Pawnbrokers Act 1996.115 The court held that
preference for the purposive and not the literal approach is the method of statutory con-
struction now prevails in Australia. The court cited Purposive Interpretation in Law to
substantiate its view: "[t]he foregoing interpretive principles remain applicable where a
term used in a statute has both a technical legal meaning and an ordinary meaning of eve-
ryday speech." 1l6
The research indicated seven other cases from India which referred to Barak's in-
terpretive approach. Rameshwar Prasad v. Union of India & Anr. discussed the con-
stitutional validity of the dissolution of the Legislative Assembly of the State of Bihar in
2005. Earlier cases that came up before the Court involved dissolutions of assemblies
which were ordered on the ground that the parties in power had lost the confidence of the
House. The present case was different - the dissolution had been ordered even before
the first meeting of the Legislative Assembly on the ground that attempts were being
made to cobble a majority by illegal means and lay claim to form the government in the
state. The court referred in this case to Barak's approach to constitutional interpretation
as discussed in his article "A Judge on Judging":
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of
construing a statute. A statute defines present rights and obligations. It
is easily enacted and as easily repealed. A constitution, by contrast, is
drafted with an eye to the future. Its function is to provide a continuing
framework for the legitimate exercise of governmental power and,
when joined by a Bill or Charter of rights, for the unremitting protec-
tion of individual rights and liberties. Once enacted, its provisions can-
not easily be repealed or amended. It must, therefore, be capable of
growth and development over time to meet new social, political and
historical realities often unimagined by its framers. The judiciary is the
guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting its provisions,
bear these considerations in mind.1 18
In New India Assurance Co. v. Wadia,119 the court had to decide who should begin
to lead evidence in proceedings under the Public Premises (Eviction of Occupants Act)
1971. In this context, the court cited the following section from Barak's book Purposive
Interpretation in Law:
Hart and Sachs also appear to treat purpose as a subjective concept. I
say appear because, although Hart and Sachs claim that the interpreter
should imagine himself or herself in the legislator[']s shoes, they intro-
duce two elements of objectivity: First, the interpreter should assume
that the legislature is composed of reasonable people seeking to achieve
reasonable goals in a reasonable manner; and second, the interpreter
should accept the non-rebuttable presumption that members of the leg-
115. Palgo Holdings Pty Ltd. v Gowans, (2005) 221 CLR 249 (Austl.).
116. Id. at para. 41.
117. Prasad v. Union of India& Am., A.I.R. 2006 S.C. 980 (India).
118. Id.
119. New India Assurance Co. v. Wadia, A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 876 (India).
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islative body sought to fulfill their constitutional duties in good faith.
This formulation allows the interpreter to inquire not into the subjective
intent of the author, but rather the intent the author would have had, had
he or she acted reasonably. 120
In five other judgments as well, the Indian courts cited Barak's exact same
words. 121
The second significant group of citations to Barak's academic writings includes
cases that refer to Barak's understanding of the role of the judiciary and judicial discre-
tion.
In the UK, an example of this has been the case of Oxfordshire CC v. Oxford City
Council Court of Appeal, which involved the definition of "village greens" for the pur-
pose of the Commons Registration Act 1965.122 In particular, the case dealt with the
question of what could and could not be done on the grass once registered as a village
123
common. The Court of Appeal cited Barak's "Judge on Judging" article as follows:
"[t]he primary concern of the supreme court in a democracy is not to correct individual
mistakes in lower court judgments. That is the job of courts of appeal. The supreme
court's concern is broader, system-wide corrective action . . ."124 More specifically, this
quote started the section discussing the role of supreme courts and courts of appeal,
which Barak described, as quoted in the decision, as "bridging the gap between law and
society." 12 5
Several United States cases referred to Barak for elaboration on judicial discretion.
In United States v. Bureau,126 the defendant challenged a judgment which sentenced him
"as an armed career criminal under 18 U.S.C.S. Section 924(e)" to 182 months impris-
onment, in a manner that reflected "a downward departure" under the U.S. Sentencing
127Guidelines Manual. The Federal Court of Appeals of the Sixth Circuit affirmed in part
and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by sentencing the defendant as
an armed career criminal, but remanded in part because it was necessary to develop a
128
complete record as to the downward departure issue. In a footnote, the court cited
Barak's book Judicial Discretion and stated:
Judicial discretion means making a choice from among a number of
lawful possibilities. A reasonable exercise of judicial discretion means
making a choice based on appropriate considerations from among the
120. Id. at para. 51 (citing PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW, supra note 21).
121. Entm't Network (India) Ltd. v. Super Cassette Indus. Ltd., (2008) 9 S.C.R. 165 (India); Writ Petition
(Civil) No. 2258 of 2008 Mahalakshmi Sugar Mills Co. v. Union of India, (2008) 5 S.C.R. 793 (India);
Kannadasan v. Khose (2009) 7 S.C.C. 1 (India); UCO Bank v. Rajinder Lal Capoor, A.I.R. 2008 S.C. 1831
(India); Union of India v. Ranbaxy Lab. Ltd., (2008) 7 S.C.C. 502 (India). All these cases cite the same quota-
tion from Barak's book.
122. Oxfordshire Cnty. Council v. Oxford City Council, [2005] EWCA Civ 175, [8]-[11], [19] (overruled by
Oxfordshire Cnty. Council v. Oxford City Council, [2006] UKHL 25).
123. Id. at para. 19.
124. Id at para. 20.
125. Id It is interesting to note that the Court of Appeal referred to these quotes from Barak as "quoted by
Baroness Hale." Id. at n.xi.
126. United States v. Bureau, 52 F.3d 584 (6th Cir. 1995).
127. Id. at 587-88.
128. Id. at 587, 594-96.
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various possibilities. The selection of an option by flipping a coin
would yield a lawful choice, but the choosing itself would be unreason-
able. From this one may conclude that the reasonable exercise of judi-
cial discretion requires an awareness of the act of choice. 129
Here, Barak's book was used to back up the court's analysis that while the it may not re-
view the exercise of discretion on sentencing except for instances of abuse, it must be
reassured from the record that discretion has indeed been exercised.
In State of Ala. ex rel. Siegelman v. United States E.P.A., 13 0 the Federal Court of
Appeals of the Eleventh Circuit rejected the argument that the Environmental Protection
Agency ("EPA") failed to provide a meaningful opportunity for public participation. In
doing so, the court relied on the fact that the EPA made available copies of relevant doc-
uments at the local public library and other state agency facilities. The EPA also made
available documents upon request. The court cited Barak's book Judicial Discretion in
analyzing the definition of "judicial discretion" and stated:
The concept of judicial discretion has been a popular subject for legal
commentators over the years. Justice Aharon Barak of the Supreme
Court of Israel has written the most recent treatise on this topic: the
English version of his book, Judicial Discretion, was published in
1989. Justice Barak's treatise attempts to continue the discussion begun
by Justice Benjamin Cardozo in his classic, The Nature of the Judicial
Process.13 1
In Karis v. Vasquez,132 the petitioner sought federal habeas corpus relief from his
conviction and death sentence under 28 U.S.C.S. Section 2254. Respondents filed a mo-
tion to dismiss. In its judgment in this matter, the District Court in the Eastern District of
California cited Barak's book Judicial Discretion and stated: "[t]he term discretion has
more than one meaning, and indeed means different things in different contexts. A. Bar-
ak, Judicial Discretion, 7 (Yale Univ. Press, ed. 1989)."133
In Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 134 the issue was whether Pennsylvania's public inde-
cency ordinance, as applied to prohibit nude dancing, violated the First Amendment's
guarantee of free expression. The court cited Barak's book Judicial Discretion when it
elaborated on the role of the judiciary in this context to "attain a delicate balance between
majority rule and the basic rights of the individual." 135
Barak's view on judicial discretion was quoted also in the Canadian case of Wong
v. Lee. 136 In this case, the issue was the law that applied in an action brought in Ontario
by a passenger, arising out of a car accident that occurred in New York State. The driver,
the passenger, the vehicle owner and their insurers were all residents of Ontario, with no
129. Id. at n.9 (citing JUDICIAL DISCRETION, supra note 21, at 35).
130. Alabama ex rel Siegelman v. U.S. E.P.A., 925 F.2d 385 (11th Cir. 1991).
131. Id. at n.5.
132. Karis v. Vasquez, 828 F. Supp. 1449 (E.D. Cal. 1993).
133. Id. at 1464.
134. Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 23 Pa. D. & C.4th 337, No. 60059-1994, 1995 WL 610276 (Ct. C.P. Pa. Erie
County Jan. 18, 1995)
135. Id. at 344. It is interesting to note that Judge Levin who wrote this decision was also the judge who au-
thored the Milcreek decision, which also cited from Barak's book. Milicreek Case, supra note 111, at 458-59.
136. Wong v. Lee, [2002] 58 O.R. 3d 398 (Can. Ont.).
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New York residents involved. Here, the dissenting opinion quoted this section from Bar-
ak's book Judicial Discretion:
To me, discretion is the power given to a person with authority to
choose between two or more alternatives, when each of the alternatives
is lawful. Justice Sussman referred to this definition, saying, "Discre-
tion means freedom to choose among different possible solutions."
Hart and Sacks offered a similar definition: "Discretion means the
power to choose between two or more courses of action each of which
is thought of as permissible." Judicial discretion, then, means the pow-
er the law gives the judge to choose among several alternatives, each of
them being lawful. 137
In India, Barak's judicial theory was cited in two cases. Dharam Dutt v. Union of
Indial38 was a case that involved a constitutional challenge to the validity of the Indian
Council of World Affairs Ordinance, 2001 (No.3 of 2001), promulgated by the President
of India on May 8, 2001, in an exercise of the powers conferred to him by clause (1) of
Article 123 of the Constitution of India. The ordinance was superseded by an Act of Par-
liament while the case was pending, and the court cited from Barak's article "Judge on
Judging" with regard to the questions raised by the new legislation:
Review of a new statute should focus not on the fact that it changes the
previous ruling of the court, but on the fact that it undermines democ-
racy. Moreover, everything is a question of degree. If the interpretation
of a statute is met with an immediate and hasty response from the leg-
islature in the form of new legislation, uncertainty about the law will
result, and the public will lose confidence in the legislative branch.
This is not the case, however, when the change in legislation after a j u-
dicial ruling reflects a thorough and deliberate examination of the rul-
ing and an objective expression of the will of the legislature . . .
[F]oundation of democracy is a legislature elected freely and periodi-
cally by the people. Judges and legal scholars ought not to forget this
fundamental principle. The role of a judge in a democracy recognizes
the central role of the legislature. Undermining the legislature under-
mines democracy. My conception of the rule of law and of the separa-
tion of powers do not undermine the legislature. Rather, they ensure
that all branches of state act within the framework of the constitution
and statutes. Only thus can we maintain public confidence in the legis-
lature; only thus can we preserve the dignity of legislation. 139
Finally, in Rupa Ashok Hurra v. Ashok Hurra,140 the court addressed the issue of
the binding power of former precedents, and in this context, referred generally to
"Aharon Barak's treatise," as a summary of "the law existing in other countries[:]" 14 1
137. Id. at para. 26 (citing JUDICIAL DISCRETION, supra note 21, at 7-9).
138. Dharam Dut v. Union of India, (2004) 1 S.C.C. 712 (India).
139. Id.
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The authority to overrule exists in most countries, whether of civil law
or common law tradition. Even the House of Lords in the United King-
dom is not bound any more by its precedents. The Supreme Court of
the United States was never bound by its own decisions, and neither
are those of Canada, Australia, and Israel.14 2
Another group of citations consists of references to Barak's writings on propor-
tionality. These were cited only by Canadian courts. This is obviously not a coincidence
considering the centrality of proportionality analysis in Canadian constitutional law and
the influence of Canadian jurisprudence on Barak's writings on proportionality. The Ca-
nadian courts cited Aharon Barak's scholarly work on six different occasions, out of
which five referred to Barak's approach to proportionality, as reflected in his article on
the matter published in Canada.
Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony43 involved a 2003 amendment to
Alberta's laws implementing certain requirements for photos for driver's licenses. Plain-
tiffs argued that "the Second Commandment prohibit[ed] them from having their photo-
graph willingly taken," and thus objected to having their photo taken on religious
144grounds. The court held that the law in this matter was "a reasonable limit on religious
freedom, demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society."14 5 The court cited
Barak's view in his article on proportionality: "[T]he rational connection test and the
least harmful measure [minimum impairment] test are essentially determined against the
background of the proper objective, and are derived from the need to realize it." 146
In Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada,14 7 media organizations covering a ter-
rorism related case challenged the constitutionality of Section 517 of the Canadian Crim-
inal Code, which required a justice of the peace "to order a publication ban" regarding
"the evidence and information produced," and "representations made, at a bail hearing"
148
and "the reasons given for the order," if the accused applied for such a ban. The ap-
pellants argued that this provision "unjustifiably violat[ed] the freedom of expression
guaranteed by the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms." 14 9 The court held that
Section 517 indeed infringed freedom of expression but decided that the limit could be
justified in a free and democratic society. The court cited Barak's article on proportional-
ity:
Whereas the rational connection test and the least harmful measure test
are essentially determined against the background of the proper objec-
tive, and are derived from the need to realize it, the test of proportion-
ality (stricto sensu) examines whether the realization of this proper ob
142. Id.
143. Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony, [2009] 2 S.C.R. 567 (Can.).
144. Id. at para. 7.
145. Id. at para. 109.
146. Id. at para. 54.
147. Toronto Star Newspapers Ltd. v. Canada, [2010] 1 S.C.R. 721 (Can.).
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jective is commensurate with the deleterious effect upon the human
right.150
The court further acknowledged that the Alberta case had endorsed Barak's theory. The
Supreme Court of Canada also referred to Barak's article on proportionality in JTI-
MacDonald Corp. v. Canada151 when it addressed the German analysis of this doc-
trine.152
In Henry v. Canada (Attorney General), "the issue was the constitutional validity
of the voter identification rules in federal elections." 153 The plaintiffs challenged recent
amendments to the Canada Elections Act, S.C. 2000, c. 9, as infringing the right to vote
guaranteed under section 3 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Once again,
the court cited Barak's article: "the rational connection test and the least harmful measure
[minimum impairment] test are essentially determined against the background of the
proper objective, and are derived from the need to realize it," which Barak describes as
the "internal limitation" in the minimum impairment test, which "prevents it [standing
alone] from granting protection to human rights." 154
Several other citations of Barak's academic writings concern discussions of con-
stitutional questions, including the protection of human rights.
In the United Kingdom, another case of this sort was Secretary of State for the
Home Office v. E & S,155 which addressed the questions of whether control orders under
anti-terrorism legislation constituted a deprivation of liberty under Article 5 of the Euro-
pean Convention on Human Rights and whether the proceedings complied with the right
to fair trial under Article 6 of the Convention. In this context, one of the parties to the
appeal cited Barak from the same article relating to his views regarding the role of courts
in reviewing anti-terrorism actions. Accordingly, the U.K. court stated that "[t]errorism
does not justify the neglect of accepted legal norms . . . a democratic state acts within the
framework of law and according to the law." 156
Another example of citation in the context of constitutional law analysis is Du
Plessis v. De Klerk.157 In this case, the defendants' newspaper article described the
flights of the plaintiff as "fuelling the war in Angola."15 8 The plaintiff sued for defama-
tion and other claims. As part of its analysis, the Constitutional Court of South Africa
looked into approaches of other systems to the application of human rights to private law
litigation (so-called "horizontal" application of human rights), and in this context, used
Barak's academic writings in this area as a source for learning comparative approaches
150. Id. at para. 20 (citing Aharon Barak, The Proportional Effect: The Israeli Experience, 57 U. TORONTO
L.J. 369, 373-74 (2007)).
151. JTI-MacDonald Corp. v. Canada, [2007] 2 S.C.R. 610 (Can.).
152. Id. atpara. 36.
153. Henry v. Canada (Att'y Gen.), [2010] 7 B.C.L.R. 5th 70, para. I (Can.).
154. Id. at para. 320. The Canadian courts also cited Aharon Barak's article on proportionality in Fiddration
des travailleurs et travailleuses du Qudbec c. Qudbec (Directeur gindral des dections), [2010] R.J.Q. 1129
(Can. Que.), and in Victoria (City) v. Adams (2008), 299 D.L.R. 4th 193 (Can.).
155. Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. E, [2007] UKHL 47, [2008] 1 AC (H.L.) 499 (Eng.).
156. Printed Case on Behalf of Liberty at para. 12, Sec'y of State for the Home Dep't v. E & S, available at
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4a7a91e92.html.
157. Du Plessis v. De Klerk, 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC) (S. Afr.).
158. Id. at para. 1.
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of other systems. More specifically, Justice Kentridge, who wrote the main opinion, used
a translated transcript of the writings of Aharon Barak from his book on constitutional
interpretation published in Hebrew in 1994.159 The judgment addresses this text as au-
thoritative.
In New Zealand, Barak's judicial writings on constitutional law were cited once.
Booker v. Policel60 concerned the meaning of the term "behaves in [a] disorderly manner
under section 4(1)(a) of the Summary Offences Act 1981," looking for "a meaning con-
sistent with the right to freedom of expression" guaranteed by section 14 of the New Zea-
land Bill of Rights Act.161 The court cited the following words from Barak's article A
Judge on Judging: "[m]ost central to all human rights is the right to dignity. It is the
source from which all other rights are derived. Dignity unites the other human rights into
a whole." 162 The court quoted Barak and stated that it completely agreed with Barak's
view and developed its discussion of the right to dignity inspired by this view.
Finally, the Czech Constitutional Court cited Barak's scholarly work in the area of
constitutional law in Stabilization of Public Budget-Sickness Benefits.163 In this case, the
court dealt with a petition filed by dozens of senators and other official officeholders
seeking to annul parts of the Act No. 261/2007 Sb., on the Stabilization of Public Budg-
ets, and other social security and labor laws amended by it. The Constitutional Court ac-
cepted the petition in part. In this case, the court interpreted the meaning of the funda-
mental right to human dignity and in this context cited Barak's book The Judge in a
Democracy.164
Only two of the cases found referred to Barak's early writings on issues of sub-
stance in the area of private law. One case of this sort comes from the United States -
Twohy v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago.165 The plaintiff was a shareholder who filed a suit
against the defendant bank for breach of contract, fraud, misrepresentation, and libel. The
Court of Appeals of the Seventh Circuit found that Spanish law applied to the case and
precluded the plaintiff from recovery. In this context, the courted cited an article by Bar-
ak on shareholders' suits.166 This is a rare case of a court citing Barak prior to his ap-
pointment as a Supreme Court Justice. It serves as an example for an ordinary use of
comparative law study to illustrate the view of other systems on the question at hand. 167
The second case of this sort comes from Australia. New South Wales v Lepore1 68
was a tort case, where the court addressed the issue of vicarious liability of a school in
159. Id. at n.54 ("We have been furnished only with a typed version of four chapters of this work (perhaps in
translation), which itself appears to be part of a larger work on constitutional interpretation, published in
1994."). The book mentioned seems to be AHARON BARAK, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION (1994) (He-
brew).
160. Brooker v Police [2007] 3 NZLR 91 (SC).
161. Id. at paras. 1,4.
162. Id. at para. 177.
163. Ustavni soud Cesk6 republiky 23.4.2008 [Decision of the Constitutional Court: Stabilization of Public
Budget-Sickness Benefits], PL. US 2/08 (Czech).
164. Id. (Eliika Wagnerova, J., dissenting).
165. Twohy v. First Nat. Bank of Chicago, 758 F.2d 1185 (7th Cir. 1985).
166. Id. at 1194 (citing Aharon Barak, Comparative Look at Protection of the Shareholder's Interest: Varia-
tions on the Derivative Suit, 20 INT'L. & COMP. L.Q. 22 (1971)).
167. Id.
168. New South Wales v Lepore (2003) 212 CLR 511 (Austl.).
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case of an assault of a pupil by a teacher. The court held that the State may be vicariously
liable and remanded the case for the district court to reconsider. This was yet another
case in which the court cited Barak's scholarly writings in torts - from the period pre-
ceding his judicial tenure. 169
IV. ANALYSIS: THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CITATIONS OF AHARON BARAK BY OTHER
COURTS
What can be learned from the usage of Barak's jurisprudence by courts and schol-
ars in other countries? It is easier to start with some general observations. First and fore-
most, this study is a telling example of the hidden biases of comparative law. Although
comparative law is presented as a neutral practice, in fact it tends to be the practice of
importing legal precedents of hegemonic counties. The most obvious example is that of
the United States legal system. The United States has been a source of ideas and legal
models for other countries, but the practice of comparative law in the United States itself
has been considered dubious and, at any rate, is under significant attack.
Second, issues of linguistic barriers and accessibility to materials are crucial. The
linguistic barrier is very evident with regard to Israel. The Israeli Supreme Court writes
in Hebrew, and therefore, only its translated decisions are potential candidates to serve as
sources of inspiration (although it is true that most of its path-breaking decisions are
eventually translated). It is telling to see the greater inclination of courts to refer to Bar-
ak's writings in books and articles published in English by renowned academic press-
es.170 In some cases, academic writings of this sort also serve as a shortcut for judges to
get to relevant foreign materials. 17 1
Third, when a certain judgment or quote is cited there are higher chances that later
decisions will cite the same quote (signaling that in these instances, the citing courts were
also influenced by the willingness of their colleagues to be inspired from abroad). In
some of these cases later citations are closer to the quote of an idiom or a proverb, than to
the use of comparative law in the full sense of the word. 172
Fourth, the inclination to cite may vary among individual judges. In Australia, Jus-
169. Id. at n.324 (citing Aharon Barak, Mixed and Vicarious Liability - A Suggested Distinction, 29 MOD. L.
REV. 160, 160-61 (1966)).
170. In a more nuanced manner, one can trace the differences between the tendencies of different courts to
cite from either Barak's decisions or his academic writings. In the U.S., Canada, and India, the references were
mostly to academic writings. Moreover, in each system other quotes dominate.
171. An illustrative example to this process is provided by a relatively recent decision of the High Court of
Delhi in Srishti School of Art, Design & Tech. v. Central Bd. of Film Certification, (2011) W.P. (C) 6806 of
2010 (High Court of New Delhi). This judgment dealt with a decision to censor statements and visuals from a
documentary film due to concerns regarding its potential effect on communal animosity between Hindus and
Muslims. Id at paras. 10-11, 13, 19. The Indian court invalidated the censorship decision and offered strong
protection to freedom of speech. Id. at paras. 42-43. In doing so, it cited several Israeli cases that dealt with
similar censorship powers, including a decision which concerned productions that touched on the Israeli -
Palestinian conflict. The court openly stated that its reference to the Israeli cases is based on an academic arti-
cle. Id. at para. 29 (citing Daphne Barak-Erez, The Law, of Historical Films: In the aftermath ofJenin, Jenin, 16
S. CAL. INTERDISc. L.J. 495 (2007)).
172. There are several instances of this phenomenon. In Canada, the same quote from the article on propor-
tionality was cited in five decisions. In India, several decisions used the same quote from the book Purposive
Interpretation, and in the U.S. the book usually cited is Judicial Discretion.
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tice Kirby was the leader in quoting Barak,1 73 and in the United States Supreme Court,
the leader was Justice Stevens. It is interesting to see that both tended to be in the minori-
ty when they did so.
There are also interesting lessons on the more concrete level regarding subject mat-
ters and contexts more susceptible to the use of comparative law. First, it is strikingly
obvious that courts have the tendency to use Israeli judgments in contexts considered in-
novative, challenging and developing, most notable national security, bioethics and the
rights of homosexuals. 174 There are probably two reasons for this. Courts feel the need
to look for inspiration from the outside when the answers are less accessible in the sys-
tem itself. In addition, there is an inclination to look for precedents from systems per-
ceived as having accumulated expertise in the subject matter, This is obviously the case
with Israeli jurisprudence in the context of national security. In fact, by any standard
Barak's decisions on national security are by far his most influential comparative legacy
(especially taking into consideration that the references to the Nahmani and Katz cases
mentioned decisions in which he took part, but not to a separate opinion he authored).
It is interesting to note that the richness of Barak's contributions in "ordinary" are-
as of private law, such as contract law and corporate law, did not have a chance to cross
borders. This is so despite the fact that he had great contributions in these areas, 175 which
in fact reflected his main fields of academic expertise prior his nomination to the
court. 176
These findings are even strengthened by the fact that one of the most cited Israeli
case ever seems to be the Eichmann decision,177 which dealt with the innovative dilem-
ma, at the time, of universal jurisdiction, in the context ofj udging Nazi war criminals. 178
Another perspective on the same matter is that of "moral guidance." In most cases,
the judges do not refer to specific legalistic models and arguments but rather to general
173. It is interesting to note in this context that Barak mentioned Justice Kirby in the introduction to this
book THE JUDGE IN A DEMOCRACY, supra note 21, at xi.
174. A similar tendency to look for inspiration in the context of developing areas of law that often pose new
moral dilemmas is exemplified by the adoption of foreign models and solutions by legislatures. See Daphne
Barak-Erez, An International Community of Legislatures?, in THE LEAST EXAMINED BRANCH: THE ROLE OF
LEGISLATURES IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL STATE 532, 541 (Richard W. Bauman & Tsvi Kahana eds., 2006);
Daphne Barak-Erez. The Institutional Aspects of Comparative Law, 15 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 477, 482-83 (2009).
175. Among his influential and original decisions in the area of contract law, for example, one should men-
tion FH 20/82 Adras Ltd. v. Harlowi & Jones GmbH42(1) PD 221 [1988] (Isr.) (recognizing the right to sue for
the restitution of the revenues accruing from an efficient breach of a contract) and CA 4628/93 State of Israel v.
Aprofim Hous. & Promotions (1991) Ltd. 49(2) PD 265 [1995] (Isr.) (stating a theory of contract interpretation
which negates the priority of the simple language of the contract over the circumstances that surrounded its
formation). The latter is considered both revolutionary and controversial in Israel. Nothing of this controversy
found its way outside Israeli borders.
176. Before his selection as Attorney General, and later on his nomination to the Israeli Supreme Court from
this position, Barak was a leading private law professor at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem.
177. Eichmann v. Att'y Gen. of Isr. 16(3) PD 2033 [1962] (Isr.), reprinted in 36 I.L.R. 277 (1968).
178. Some of the judgments which cite the Eichmann decision are: In Re Agent Orange Product Liability
Litigation, 373 F.Supp.2d 7, 88 (E.D.N.Y. 2005); Jones v. Ministry of Interior of Saudi Arabia, [2004] EWCA
(Civ) 1394, [2005] 2 W.L.R. 808 para. 52 (Eng.); Jorgic v Germany, App. No. 74613/01 para. 51 (Eur. Ct. H.R.
July 12, 2007); R. v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex p. Pinochet Ugarte, [1999] UKHL 17,
[2000] 1 A.C. (H.L) 147 (appeal taken from Eng.); R (on the application of Mohamed) v. Sec'y of State for
Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, [2008] EWHC (Admin) 2048, [2009] 1 W.L.R. 2579, para. 156; United
States ex rel. Lujan v. Gengler, 510 F.2d 62, 66-67 (2d Cir. 1975). In addition, the Eichmann decision was even
cited by Lord Bingham of Comhill in the decision of the House of Lords on the use of evidence collected by
the use of torture in third countries. See text accompanying supra notes 38-39.
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moral and ethical views (e.g. on the proper balance between human rights and national
security). There is a special inclination to cite idioms and metaphors which carry a mes-
sage (such as the dilemma of a democracy which has to fight terrorism with one its hands
tied up).
With regard to Barak's special status as both a scholar and judge it is worthwhile to
point out that this combination had a special influence on the choice to cite his writings.
His writings on judicial issues attracted additional interest of judges due to his dual ca-
pacity and thus dual authority as both an academic and a judge. His ordinary academic
writing from the time preceding his appointment to the court has been mentioned only
marginally.
CONCLUSION
The analysis of the case-study discussed in this article lead to conclusions which
can be considered alarming from the perspective of those interested in comparative law
as an egalitarian practice. Judges who come from small and non-hegemonic countries
have low chances of being quoted by their counterparts in other jurisdictions. The case of
Aharon Barak is the exception. Does this mean that the practice of comparative law is
doomed to be hegemonic or shallow? The answer is definitely not. However, it is im-
portant to realize that the blessings of comparative law are partial when the discipline
does not take full account of its potential. Barak himself succeeded in crossing borders
thanks to his academic stature and his rich publications in English, coupled with the
unique nature of several of the decisions he gave (especially in the area of national secu-
rity). At any rate, with a view to the future, it is crucial that the study of comparative law
be more accountable to its hidden biases.
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